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The Place for Judicial
Activism on the Part
of a State's
Highest Court
By JAMES DUKE CAMERON*
Introduction**
The term "judicial activism" tends to have a different meaning for
each reader. It is most often used to describe the attitude of courts that, by
adopting an aggressive and creative position, depart from what is expected
by issuing unanticipated decisions and making new case law. Judicial ac-
tivism, however, is not confined to substantive law. In this article the term
will be used to encompass not only activism in the decision-making process,
but also activism in the administration of the judicial branch of government.
This writer believes that the state supreme courts should exercise restraint in
the decision-making process but should be less timid and more active in the
administration of the judiciary. This must be done if the judicial branch is to
maintain its independence as a separate, even if not completely equal,
branch of government. This article will address itself first to judicial ac-
tivism in the area of substantive law, including some of the justifications for
judicial restraint, and then to judicial activism in the field of judicial admin-
istration.
I. Judicial Activism in the Decision-Making Process
Those who believe that law should be found and not made are quick to
reiterate that the courts should not be superlegislatures or continuing con-
stitutional conventions. These critics contend that when courts depart from
strict stare decisis to become lawmakers, they are acting contrary to the
Constitution, to the common law, and to common sense. Critics view any
* Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court. A.B., University of California
(Berkeley), J.D., University of Arizona.
** The author is indebted to Linda Pollock, A.B., J.D., University of Arizona, and
John Shadegg, A.B., J.D., University of Arizona, for their help and assistance in the
preparation of this article.
[279]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
such deviation with suspicion, if not contempt. Judicial activists, on the
other hand, contend that judges not only should, but must make law to
further the ends of justice and to ensure that the law is responsive to the
needs of modem society. Some authors suggest that a judge is at his noblest
when he is making new law,' and that yesterday's activism is today's stare
decisis. Thus, for judicial activists, a court that makes new law is a court
that does justice.
The truth, as usual, lies somewhere in the middle. Courts do make law
as well as find it. Further, this is not a recent phenomenon; the Supreme
Court in the early case ofMarbury v. Madison2 engaged in judicial activism.
Whenever a court applies or refuses to apply a constitutional provision,
statute, or prior case to a given fact situation, it gives that constitutional
provision, statute, or case a new meaning, no matter how slight. If it is to
keep pace with an increasingly complex and technical society, the law
cannot remain static and brittle. By giving it new meaning, the courts mold
the law to meet the needs of a changing society.
While most courts recognize the necessity for some change, courts
today are pressured to go even further in reshaping the law to meet contem-
porary problems. They are asked to redress almost every evil, real or im-
agined, to provide, by judicial fiat, instant equality not only of opportunity
but also of achievement, to redress every grievance no matter how ancient or
trivial, and to soothe every hurt or insult no matter how slight or unintended.
The courts are constantly told that they and only they cali provide the relief
requested or even demanded by an impatient public.
Professor Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia University Law School con-
tends that the courts have three great advantages over legislatures in making
new law. First, the courts are conclusive because their decisions, once final,
are not readily changeable. Second, the courts can, for all their delays, reach
a definite result sooner than legislatures. Third, the courts are better able to
focus on a particular problem than are legislatures.3 Fos Judge Day, judicial
1. "It is the function of our courts . . . to keep the doctrines up to date with the
mores by continual restatement and by giving them a continually new content. This is
judicial legislation, and the judge legislates at his peril. Nevertheless, it is the necessity
and duty of such legislation that gives to judicial office its highest honor; and no brave
and honest judge shirks the duty or fears the peril." Arthur L. Corbin, quoted in CAR-
DOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 135 (1921); see also Tate, The Lav-
Making Function of the Judge, 28 LA. L. REv. 211 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Tate);
Day, Why Judges Must Make Law, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 563 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Day].
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. See Rosenberg, Anything Legislatures Can Do, Courts Can Do Better?, 62
A.B.A.J. 587 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rosenberg].
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lawmaking is essential to the operation of our constitutional system of gov-
ernment.4 The question, however, is not whether courts do make law, but
rather when and how much new law they should make. Perhaps Karl Llewe-
lyn's "law of leeways" is the best guideline:
[A]n appellate court is free, without hesitation and without apology, to
make any shift in content and direction of authorities which can be
worked by the semi-automatic process by which authorities just take on
new light, color, shape and wording-as they are reviewed against fresh
circumstance; but that conscious reshaping must so move as to hold the
degree of movement down to the degree which need truly presses.5
Holding "the degree of movement down" is judicial restraint, which can be
justified by three arguments, among others: First, in exercising judicial
restraint, the courts do what is expected of them, and this benefits society.
Second, when they engage in lawmaking, not only do the courts usurp the
historic and proper role of the legislature, they also engage in an activity for
which they are ill equipped. The third reason for judicial restraint is the
detrimental effect of judicial activism on the court's case load; an over-
loaded court cannot provide swift and individual justice.
A. Courts Should Live up to Society's Expectations
Sir Francis Bacon's early statement that "Ij]udges ought to remember
that their office is . . . to interpret law, and not to make law," 6 has been
repeated and oversimplified by several generations of high school civics
teachers who have led our citizenry to believe that "it is somehow improper
for judges to admit to law-innovation, law-choice, or law-revision."I Ad-
mittedly, civics teachers may have oversimplified the problem, but they do
reflect the prevailing view of a vast majority of our society that lawmaking is
not a proper function of the court. Courts are expected to find, not make, the
law, and to the extent that they appear to step outside the parameters of
judicial law-finding, they are perceived to venture beyond their proper func-
tion. Judges are not free artists: their job specification carries with it the
moral obligation to follow an institutionalized pattern in deciding cases.'
Indeed,
[T]he legal system as an institution favors a policy of judicial (as distin-
guished from legislative or executive) conservatism. The policy finds life
in rules and principles that reflect a presumption in favor of the status quo
when a judge pursues the proper method of judicial decision. This pre-
4. See Day, supra note 1, at 575.
5. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 156 (1960).
6. BACON'S ESSAYS, Of Judicature, quoted in Tate, supra note 1, at 233-34.
7. Tate, supra note 1, at 234.
8. Shuman, Justification of Judicial Decisions, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 715, 722
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Shuman].
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sumption, in turn, is given effect by the doctrine of stare decisis in that
judges who play their role the way they should will give respect to prior
decisions. Giving respect to or standing by prior decisions as obligated
by stare decisis does not tell the judge how to decide a future case.
Rather, it tells him and those who will assess his performance that
whatever decision he reaches, he must account for all arguably relevant
rules, principles, and policies announced in prior cases.'
While the legislative and executive branches of government ascertain the
will of the majority and carry that will into effect, the courts frequently
perform an opposite role, thwarting the popular will in order to protect the
rights of the minority. Decisions of a court are often and of necessity
unpopular. with a majority of society as well as with the other two branches
of government. To the extent that courts perform their role as expected, their
decisions, even if unpopular, will have a greater chance of being accepted
and followed by society. In addition, by maintaining a conservative stance,
the courts help to preserve the sense of security and stability society re-
quires. The more the other two branches of government engage in the
politics of change, the greater the need for a stable and predictable judicial
branch.
Professor Bodenheimer believes that the rise of liberalism in the west-
ern world and the attendant multiplicity of religions and philosophies, to-
gether with widespread erosion of traditional authorities, have emphasized
society's need for judicial stability.'0 If the courts exercise judicial restraint,
society can be expected to look to them as unchanging institutions whose
decisions are predictable. But if the courts deviate from their expected
method of decision-making and issue novel and creative decisions, the sta-
bility and security that society needs from the courts will wane.
B. Courts Are Poor Legislatures
Courts are not designed to be legislatures. They cannot marshall the
facts necessary to play out the legislative role. They cannot conduct legisla-
tive hearings to obtain evidence and testimony, and they cannot, without
doing violence to the adversary system, go outside the record to find addi-
tional information upon which to base a particular decision. Professor
Rosenberg recognizes this when he suggests that the courts adopt certain
legislative procedures."1 He and Professors Miller and Barron have all rec-
ognized the need for gathering facts outside the record if the courts are to
legislate effectively. They have suggested a public agency of scientists and
9. Id. at 721.
10. See Bodenheimer, Philosophical Anthropology and the Law, 59 CALIF. L.
REv. 653, 665-67 (1971).
11. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 587-90.
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social scientists to advise courts whose decision-making has become law-
making.12
The courts should not yet abandon the adversary system completely and
go beyond the record to cull from other sources the information required for
their decisions. Such a course would not only yield decisions based upon
facts untested by cross-examination, but would also make persons who are
not officers of the court, and who have no obligation to the court as an
institution, far too influential in the court's decision-making process.
There is also the danger that legislation by the courts may be too hasty.
Usually, courts can decide a case more quickly than the legislature can act;
most extensive and competent legislation requires the work of several ses-
sions before it is finally passed. 3 However, this delay gives the various
interest groups the opportunity to present their views, ideally leading to
better legislation.
Because of their self-imposed obligation to focus on the narrow issue
before them, courts are necessarily bad legislatures. A legislative body is
better able to consider a problem in its broadest sense; the legislature has the
benefit of lobbyists on all sides and of expert testimony. Allowed to consider
the forest as well as the trees, legislatures are better suited to enacting laws.
Nor is lack of legislative action a justification for judicial activism. The
latter may in fact cause the former: "Judicial activism also erodes the
legislative process, because it tends to relieve legislators from accountability
for social reconstruction and constitutional propriety."' 4
Rather than compete with the legislatures, the courts should cooperate
with them by passing upon laws that they draft, the job for which the courts
were designed, and the job they perform effectively. Furthermore, a court
that has engaged in judicial legislation loses its objectivity and impartiality
when the wisdom or constitutionality of its own "legislation" is challenged
in subsequent litigation.
C. Judicial Activism Increases the Caseload
An effect of judicial activism that should be of great concern to the
courts and to potential litigants is that such activism increases the caseload
of the courts themselves. Judicial activism leads to uncertainty in the law,
and uncertainty leads to more litigation. In Arizona, for example, as a result
of judicial activism, the number of criminal appeals went from 20 in 1960 to
12. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 590. Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, -the
Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61
VA. L. REv. 1187, 1240-42 (1975).
13. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 587.
14. Adams, Judicial Restraint, the Best Medicine, 60 JUD. 179, 181 (1976).
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1,056 fifteen years later. 5 When the law is definite and certain, most people
are willing to work within its parameters without continually resorting to the
courts. But when the courts start taking into account matters outside the law,
particularly so-called socially relevant matters, there is far less need to
accept prior decisions as controlling and to abide by them."6 In civil matters
as well people resort to courts more frequently, expecting that regardless of
what the law was before, it will be changed for their situation. Furthermore,
the losing party automatically considers an appeal to be the next logical step
after trial.
The Board of Governors of the Society of American Law Teachers
recently issued a statement charging that the Burger Court is forging a set of
restrictive doctrines which will substantially reduce the availability of the
federal courts for public interest litigation.' 7 The statement predicts that
since state courts have not been especially receptive to lawsuits, many rights
will remain without a remedy.' 8 This statement is undoubtedly true. The
United States Supreme Court is presently reluctant to take on more litigation
for the same reason the lower courts are: it rightly perceives that excessive
use of the courts can destroy the separate and equal nature of the judicial
branch. Judge Carl McGowan of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit believes that neither the courts nor the Congress
should unnecessarily increase the caseload of the federal judiciary.19 Be-
cause of the critical importance in our society of the judiciary as the ultimate
guardian and expositor of the Constitution, "it is not the concern of lawyers
alone that its flame be not dimmed by either congressional neglect or a too
expansive concept by court or legislature of how far its light can reach.""0
Overloading a court can seriously damage if not destroy its effective-
ness and the quality of its work. In opposing extensive provisions for judi-
15. Statistics provided by Noel Dessaint, Administrative Director of the Arizona
Supreme Court. The increase in the number of criminal appeals has been a direct result of
the activism of the United States Supreme Court in the field of criminal procedure, start-
ing with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This author does not subscribe to the view
that this has necessarily been bad. One result, however, has been that the expansion and
extension of various procedural safeguards to criminal defendants in the state courts has
greatly increased the workload of the state courts.
16. Schuman, supra note 8, at 725.
17. Society of American Law Teachers, Supreme Court Denial of Citizen Access to
Federal Courts to Challenge Unconstitutional or other Unlawful Actions: the Record of the
Burger Court, Unpublished Statement 2 (October 1976). The areas in which these restric-
tive doctrines are being enunciated are class actions, standing to sue, federal review of
constitutional claims in state criminal and civil proceedings, attorneys' fees, and the
power of the federal court to fashion equitable remedies. Id. at 2-3.
18. Id. at 3.
19. See McGowan, Congress and the Courts, 62 A.B.A.J. 1588 (1976).
20. Id. at 1591.
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cial review in a bill creating a strong public utilities commission, the then
New York Governor Charles Evans Hughes stated that, "no more insidious
assault could be made upon the independence and esteem of the judiciary
than to burden it with these questions of administration. . . .Let us keep
the courts for the questions they were intended to consider.''21
But even if increasing recourse to the courts does not destroy the
effectiveness of the judicial branch, it can destroy individual justice. As our
society becomes more complex and more impersonal, individuals feel an
acute need for an institution to give personal attention to their particular
cases. The cost of preserving a system of individual justice is high, but
easily justifiable. "[T]he court system must not become just another
bureaucracy, cramming litigation papers into suitable slots or at least the
closest-fitting cubbyhole.''22
II. Activism and Judicial Administration
Although judicial restraint may be preferred in the decision-making
process, the courts must not be timid where their own prerogatives are
concerned. To maintain their independence, the courts must follow a path of
activism in the field of judicial administration:
[T]he separation of powers doctrine, properly understood, imposes
on the judicial branch not merely a negative duty not to interfere with the
executive or legislative branches, but apositive responsibility to perform
its own job efficiently. This positive aspect of separation of powers
imposes on courts affirmative obligations to assert and fully exercise
their powers, to operate efficiently by modern standards, to protect their
independent status, and to fend off legislative or executive attempts to
encroach upon judicial prerogatives.23
The court has inherent power to do whatever is necessary for it to
function as a court. Whether this power be described as implied, essential,
or incidental, the court has the authority to do what is "essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the court as a constitutional tribunal...
from the very fact that it is a court.''24 The state's highest court should use
this power in three distinct ways. First, it should make rules governing the
procedures for the operation of all the courts in the state judicial system.
Second, it should control, by court rule, the admission to practice and the
continuing supervision and discipline of members of the bar. Finally, it
should remove members of the judiciary who are guilty of misconduct or
become disabled and are no longer able to serve as judges.
21. Id. at 1589.
22. Tate, Containing the Law Explosion, 56 JUD. 228, 234 (1973).
23. Carrigan, Inherent Powers and Finance, 7 TRIAL 22, 22 (Sept./Oct. 1971).
24. Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635, 636 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as Dowling].
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A. Rule-Making
The state's highest court should actively exercise its power to prescribe
rules of procedure for the operation of the state judicial system. This power
should not be shared with any other agency or branch of government.
The courts of England made their own rules of procedure from the
earliest times of which we have a record. George Grayson Tyler notes that a
rule dated 1457 confers on the prothonotaries in the Court of Common Pleas
the function of drawing up "general rules, for regulating and settling the
practice of the court, and the proceedings therein; and to certify the court in
matters of practice, when required. "25 By the time the American Constitu-
tion was drafted, the King's Bench at Westminster had been exercising the
power to make general rules of procedure for the courts under its jurisdic-
tion. Tidd's Practice was the standard book for colonial American as well as
English procedure. As Dean Roscoe Pound has pointed out:
Hence, if anything was received from England as a part of our institu-
tions, it was that the making of these general rules of practice was a
judicial function. Indeed, this was well understood in the beginning of
American law. At the very outset, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in answer to an inquiry by the Attorney General, said that the
practice of the court of King's Bench would obtain for the time being,
but that presently the court would promulgate some rules of practice. Not
only was this done by the Supreme Court of the United States, but the old
Supreme Court of New York, before 1847, promulgated rules of prac-
tice, very many of which were simply turned into sections of the Code of
Procedure and are in force under that guise today.2 6
Unfortunately, in both England and the United States the legislative branch
began to encroach upon the judiciary in the rule-making function.
Dean Pound believed that in England the regulation of procedure went
through four stages, legislative interference appearing only in the third
stage, after the judicial tribunals in the second stage had formalized in rules
of court what was originally the customary procedure of the tribunal. In the
third stage, "Parliament makes sweeping changes both in fundamentals and
in detail. For a season legislation is called on to bear the brunt of procedural
reform. "2 It should be noted, however, that even when the Parliament did
25. Tyler, The Origin of ihe Rule-Making Power and Its Exercise by Legislatures,
22 A.B.A.J. 772, 774 (1936) (citation omitted) [hereinafter cited as Tyler]. According to
Tyler, this rule alone indicates the antiquity of court rules, even though Tidd's tables for
the Court of King's Bench include no rules prior to 1604. "[I]t is hardly to be supposed
that none existed prior to that time. It is probable Tidd merely had no occasion to cite
them. We have the opinion of Jenks that court-made rules of practice go back uninterrup-
tedly through the years until they are lost in the still unexamined archives of the four-
teenth century." Id.
26. Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 601 (1926)
[hereinafter cited as Pound].
27. Id. at 599. By 1873 the English courts had regained control of their own rules.
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intrude upon the court's rule-making function, it tacitly recognized the inhe-
rent power of the courts to make rules. The code of procedure adopted by
Parliament in 1852 contained a provision permitting the judges to alter or
amend any of the rules enacted by Parliament.28 The Judicature Act of 1873
"returned" the jurisdiction of the court rules back to the courts.29
In the United States, legislative encroachment upon the rule-making
power of the courts was led by David Dudley Field and his Codes of
Procedure. Written in an era of legislative supremacy, these codes of proce-
dure for courts were an abject failure. Unfortunately, the courts acquiesced
in this exercise of legislative power; some of the state courts went so far as to
hold that the rule-making power could only be exercised by the courts if
granted to them by the legislature. 3°
The United States Supreme Court still recognizes legislative supremacy
in rule-making. The United States Code, which authorizes rule-making by
the Supreme Court generally, provides specifically: "Such rules shall not
take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at
or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first
day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus
reported." 31 The Supreme Court relied on this congressional authority for its
decision in Hanna v. Plumer:32
For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by
the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to
make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in
turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the
uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable
of classification as either.33
By the turn of the century, many writers were convinced not only that
the enactment by the legislative branch of rules of procedure for the courts
was an encroachment on the power of the court, in which by misfortune
some courts had acquiesced, but also that the results of these rules had been
dismal.34 State courts later followed in defending their prerogatives and
28. Sunderland, The Exercise of the Rule-Making Power, 12 A.B.A.J. 548, 548-
49 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Sunderland]; Tyler, supra note 25, at 774. As adopted by
Parliament, this code contained 239 sections. Sunderland, supra at 549.
29. Tyler, supra note 25, at 774-75.
30. Note, The Judiciary and the Rule-Making Power, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 377,
381 (1971); Fair v. State, 220 Ga. 750, 141 S.E.2d 431 (1965).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
32. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
33. Id. at 472.
34. Dowling, supra note 24, at 636; Franck, Practice and Procedure in Missis-
sippi: An Ancient Recipe for Modern Reform, 43 MIss. L.J. 287 (1972); Pound, supra
note 26, at 601; Sunderland, supra note 28, at 549; Tyler, supra note 25, at 774. Dean
Pound blamed the relinquishment by the courts of their inherent power to make their own
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today recognize that the rule-making power is historically deposited with
them as part of their inherent power.35 Professor Wigmore goes further than
most commentators by declaring:
[T]he legislature (federal or state) exceeds its constitutional power when
it attempts to impose upon the judiciary any rules for the dispatch of the
judiciary's duties; and that therefore all legislatively declared rules for
procedure, civil or criminal, in the courts, are void, except such as are
expressly stated in the Constitution. 6
The state's highest court can and should be bold and liberal in the
exercise of its rule-making power. Here judicial activists are needed and
restraint is a detriment. The judiciary should not share this power with the
legislature or with anyone else, although it can and should invite members of
the bar to assist in drafting rules. The actual making of the rules, however, is
a court function to be guarded jealously.
B. Integration of The Bar by Court Rule
Another area in which the state's highest court should actively assert its
inherent power is in the admission to practice and the control of the members
of the bar. Historically,. while the courts have sought to protect their inherent
power to supervise the bar, attempts to take this power away from them have
been persistent.
In colonial America, attorneys were admitted upon motion by the
court, usually after an apprenticeship and occasionally after an oral examina-
tion. This was not, however, the universal practice. One colony, New
Jersey, required that attorneys "practicing. . .for hire" be admitted by the
governor.3" Legislative interference was also not unknown. The Virginia
rules on the "rule-of-thumb aplwentice training of the bulk of the profession, which led
them to feel that the whole of the law was bound up in procedure and hence that the
legislature must prescribe judicial procedure or abdicate control over the law." Pound,
supra note 26, at 601. But historically this rule-making power has belonged to the courts:
"For the common-law courts have governed procedure by general rules from the middle
ages to the present, and the first public action of the Supreme Court of the United States
was to make a rule adopting the practice of the Court of King's Bench as the practice of
that tribunal." Id.
35. Garabedian v. Donald William, Inc., 106 N.H. 156, 157, 207 A.2d 425, 426
(1965); Craft v. Commonwealth, 343 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Ky. 1961). The court in Craft
points out that "it has generally been recognized that courts (even without express author-
ity given by the constitution, statute, or rule of a supreme court of a state) have inherent
power to prescribe rules to regulate their proceedings and to facilitate the administration
of justice." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
36. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitution-
ally, 23 Nw. U.L. REV. 276, 276 (1928).




Legislative Assembly in 1643 passed a law that required lawyers to be
licensed and their fees regulated, and all such "mercenary attorneys" were
expelled because "many troublesome suits [were being] multiplied by the
unskillfulness and covetousness of attorneys, who-have more intended their
own profit and their inordinate lucre than the good and benefit of their
clients." Thirteen years later, the law was repealed. 8 In 1786, in Mas-
sachusetts, lawyers were voted a "grievance" and a bill was passed by the
House to throw open the courts to all persons of good character.39
When the United States became a nation, antagonism toward lawyers
increased. With the election of Andrew Jackson as President, a wave of
popular democracy swept over the country and legislation was passed in
many states to permit any man to practice law as a check against a monopoly
by a favored class. The Constitution of Indiana in 1851 provided: "Every
person of good moral character who is a voter is entitled to practice law in
any of the courts in this state." 4
Many courts voluntarily shared with the legislature control over the
practice of the law. The Arizona Supreme Court followed the then current
majority rule when it held that the Arizona legislature could prescribe
minimum qualifications for admission to the bar, which the court would
follow in addition to such other requirements as it might impose.4 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated the minority view when invalidating a
similar statute passed by the Pennsylvania legislature:
[The Act of 1887] is an encroachment upon the judiciary department of
the government ...
It is an imperative command to admit any person to practice law
upon complying with certain specified conditions. . . .No judge is
bound to admit, or can be compelled to admit, a person to practice law
who is not properly qualified, or whose moral character is bad ...
The attorney is an officer of the court, and is brought into close and
intimate relations with the court. Whether he shall be admitted, or
whether he shall be disbarred, is a judicial and not a legislative, ques-
tion.42
As the number of bar associations increased, a movement began for the
creation of an integrated bar requiring membership as a condition of admis-
sion to practice law. Quite often this was accomplished by legislation rather
than by court rule, an approach whose problems were soon apparent. The
bar association was controlled by the legislature. The dues, the membership
38. Hallam, Early Courts and Lawyers, 25 YALE L.J. 386, 386-87 (1916).
39. Id. at 388.
40. B. ScHwARTz, THE LAW IN AMERICA 78 (1974); IND. CONST. art. VII,
§ 21 (repealed 1932).
41. In re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 81 P.2d 96 (1938).
42. In re Splane, 16 A. 481, 483 (Pa. 1889).
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of the board of governors of the bar and their committee members, and other
matters of a professional nature were under the supervision of a frequently
antagonistic legislature, or at least one with little understanding of the prob-
lems of the practice of law: As a result, state supreme courts commenced
integrating the bar by court rule. These movements have generally withstood
attack."
The procedure Arizona followed in extracting itself from partial control
of the bar is indicative of one court's "activism" in this regard. The Arizona
bar was integrated by a statute of the Arizona Legislature in 1932. The
statute was quite inclusive, regulating the method of election and the number
of members of the Board of Governors, as well as the composition, jurisdic-
tion, and venue of the various state ethics committees. The bar association
was compelled to go to the legislature for even the slightest change in its
organization." The conflict culminated when certain legislators introduced a
bill that would have provided that any member of the legislature who had
served four years could be admitted to the bar on the basis of legislative
experience." Also, a state reorganization bill was introduced that would
have placed the Board of Governors of the State Bar under a proposed
Department of Commerce.4" In response, the Board of Governors of the
State Bar of Arizona passed a resolution urging the Arizona Supreme Court
to adopt its own rules organizing the state bar.4" The Arizona Supreme Court
responded by issuing a press release 8 announcing that on January 19, 1973,
they would consider the State Bar Resolution. The Supreme Court also
requested the public to submit for its consideration any suggestions, ob-
jections, or criticism. Only a few people, including one legislator, availed
43. Lathrop v. Donohoe, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 106
R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692 (1970); rnre Unification of New Hampshire Bar, 109 N.H. 260,
248 A.2d 709 (1968); In re Integration of the Bar of Hawaii, 432 P.2d 887 (1967); Peti-
tion of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 S.2d 902 (1949); Petition for Integration of Bar of
Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N.W.2d 515 (1943); In re Integration of State Bar of Ok-
lahoma, 185 Okla. 505, 95 P.2d 113 (1939); In re Integration of Nebraska Bar Ass'n,
133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265 (1937).
44. Historically, Arizona has never had a large number of lawyers in the State
Legislature. At the present time, there are not more than 6 lawyers out of 90 members of
both houses.
45. S. 191, 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (1968). The statement was made by a member of
the legislature, "After all, who knows more about the laws than Nve do who make them."
46. S. Con. Res. 15, 30th Leg., Ist Sess. (1970). It should be noted that the State
Bar of Arizona had never received public funds for any of its operations and was com-
pletely self-supporting, although the amount of the dues that the attorneys paid had to be
approved by the legislature. ARIZ. REV. STAT., S. CT. RULE 27(k) (1973).
47. Correspondence between Arizona State Bar Association and Arizona Supreme
Court, 10/28/72.
48. Press release by Arizona Supreme Court, 1/8/73.
[Vol. 4
Spring 1977] STATE COURT ACTIVISM
themselves of this opportunity. Thereafter, the Arizona Supreme Court in-
tegrated the bar by court rule.49
Ever since that action was taken, the Arizona bar association has been
one of the most active in the United States. Free of the restraints imposed by
a suspicious legislature, it has enjoyed a greater independence than it did
previously and has been better able to serve the needs of a rapidly growing
bar in a rapidly growing state. The Arizona Supreme Court has the power to
change the rules governing the bar. The court has changed the membership
of the committee that provides for discipline of lawyers and has added two
non-lawyer members. In short, the court, with the help of the bar, is in
control of the qualification of the state bar. Integration by court rule has been
of great benefit to the court, to the bar of Arizona, to the state, and to the
taxpayers.
However, a caveat should be observed here. Such an integrated bar
should be willing to support itself. As long as the legislature appropriates
money for the discipline of attorneys or any other bar activity, as it does in
some states, it of course retains a right to say how and by whom those funds
shall be spent. Therefore, the bar must accept its financial responsibility,
and the state's highest court should actively undertake to assure that it does
SO.
C. Discipline of Judges
The state's highest court should actively use its inherent power to
preserve and maintain the integrity of the judicial system. The traditional
method of removing a judge by way of impeachment is a cumbersome and
difficult process, to be avoided except in the most flagrant cases. Alterna-
tively, a judicial removal and disability commission created by constitu-
tional amendment may recommend dismissal. California was the first state
to establish such a commission,5" and today some thirty-seven states and
Puerto Rico have some type of administrative system for the removal and
discipline of judges. 5 These commissions typically have the power to re-
move a judge from office permanently and to impose other forms of discip-
line. Because of the superiority of judicial removal and disability commis-
sions over traditional methods such as impeachment and recall, the highest
court of any state that does not yet have such a procedure should actively
urge the adoption by constitutional amendment of a judicial removal and
disability commission.
49. 17A ARiz. REV. STAT., S. CT. RULE 27(a) (1973).
50. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 8; CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 68701-755 (West 1970).
51. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 24-31,
Table 9 (rev. ed. 1976).
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Although the state constitution may not provide for a judicial removal
commission, the state's highest court nonetheless has the inherent authority
to act to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to maintain public
confidence in the administration of justice. For example, in states where it is
a requirement that a judge be a member of the bar, the state supreme court
can as a method of discipline disbar the judge, thereby insuring that he does
not meet a requirement for continuation in office.5" The state's highest court
also has the power to promulgate standards of conduct for all judges in the
state " and to discipline judges who violate the provisions of such stan-
dards.54 Furthermore, the same sources that give a state supreme court the
power to conduct hearings on possible judicial misconduct give it the power
to punish such misconduct.55
If the era of legislative encroachment in the field of procedural rules of
the court and in the control of admission to the bar is subsiding, a period of
legislative interference in the field of judicial discipline seems to be on the
rise. The Judicial Reform Act,56 introduced by Senator Tydings, and the
Judicial Tenure Act,5" sponsored by Senators Nunn, Allen, and Gain, al-
though declaring that the judiciary should act in this field, actually repre-
sented an attempt to permit legislative encroachment in the area.5 In Illinois
the legislature attempted to investigate a judge and had to be reminded by
the courts that it could investigate for legislative purposes only. 9 If the
highest courts of the states do not take a more active part in judicial discip-
line and removal, public pressure will prompt the legislative branch to
encroach further upon the judiciary.
A state's highest court can and should take the lead in judicial discip-
line. It should recommend the creation of a judicial discipline commission if
one does not exist. In addition, it should exercise its implied power
whenever and wherever necessary. As the United States Supreme Court
once stated: "[T]he courts ought not to hesitate . . . to protect themselves
52. In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 268-70 (1961).
53. In re Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis.2d 252, 254, 153 N.W.2d 873, 874
(1967).
54. Jenkins v. Oregon State Bar, 241 Ore. 283, 288-89, 405 P.2d 525, 527-28
(1965).
55. In re DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 787, 807-09, 279 N.E.2d 296, 307-08 (1972); In
re DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 757, 759, 274 N.E.2d 455, 456 (1971); In re Mussman, 112
N.H. 99, 101-03, 289 A.2d 403, 404-06 (1972); In re Diener 268 Md. 659, 686-88, 304
A.2d 587, 594, 597 (1973).
56. S. 1506, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
57. S. 1110, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
58. See Battisti, An Independent Judiciary or an Evanescent Dream, 25 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 711, 729-32 (1975); Comment, The Limitations of Article III on the Pro-
posed Judicial Removal Machinery: S. 1506, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1064 (1970).
59. Cusack v. Howlett, 44 Il1.2d 233, 236-44, 254 N.E.2d 506, 508-12 (1969).
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from scandal and contempt, and the public from prejudice, by removing
grossly improper persons from participation in the administration of the
laws.""°
Conclusion
Judicial activism in the decision-making process should be avoided and
restraint exercised if the courts are to keep the respect of the society they
serve and if their opinions are to be followed. Courts are poor legislatures
and should leave this task to the legislative branch. In addition, judicial
activism leads to overuse of the courts, which could well destroy their
effectiveness. But if the states' highest courts should be restrained in their
approach to the decision-making process, they must be bolder and more
active in exercising their inherent power in the field of judicial administra-
tion. At stake is the independence and effectiveness of the judicial bran6h of
government. If the public is to be served and the litigant treated justly, the
courts must exercise their inherent powers to regulate and to improve the
administration of justice. Unless the judiciary is to become the dinosaur of
the American political system, it must vigorously, effectively, and aggres-
sively defend its own rights and prerogatives. This is the proper place for
activism, not only by the state's highest court, but by federal courts as well.
60. Exparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882).
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